The Huemer would acknowledge the type of response to

The starting premise made by Huemer is called the infinite regress. This proposition is constructed from a visceral awareness that aims to verify epistemic claims.
For us to verify that we recognize some premise U, we would need to have a little awareness of another argument S, that could assist in explaining my knowledge of U. In order to fundamentally establish my knowledge of S, I might be required to have some knowledge of a third proposition T, and so forth. The claims made can be grounded circularly between each other, but the structure is not suffice for justifying basic knowledge. In terms of this argument, one can attempt to avoid the regress model and construct a starting point for the series of basic knowledge claims. However, proposing a new point causes problems for the epistemic status of the claim being used as that point. Huemer would acknowledge the type of response to the first argument and then would strengthen the position of the skeptic by responding to a probable objection. Huemer takes note that the other thinkers believe there is a blemish in the starting principle, thus they would state contrary to it, and that foundational propositions  can let “one recognize it to be legitimate without having a reasonable reason” (Huemer,10). With this possible objection, Mike Huemer believes the skeptic has a response.
A skeptic  can contend that an individual needs to have the capability to provide a way of determining between a foundational argument (e.g. 2=2) or a conscious one (e.g. twelve-headed monster on Mars) (Huemer,10). The skeptic can denote that there is no foundational proposition since one proposition has to have a feature attached to it, thus provides a reason for the starting proposition. So the beginning is not foundational, because it provides reason for the feature and it does not distinguishes between other propositions.
The second argument Huemer raises based on the skeptic, is the problem of the criterion. This premise raises some points based on circular reasoning, but its solely associated with a central claim that we can only trust certain judgments created by a particular method (e.g. reasoning), if we know autonomously that the mechanism is reliable. However, the mechanism itself to test its reliability, would trigger a circularity dilemma. If we attempt to use another method, we can have the ability to ask why that second method was reliable. Since we do not have endless possibilities of methods to construct judgments, and since none of the mechanisms can free themselves, it seems we cannot explain why any of the methods are reliable. And so, if none of the the mechanisms forming the judgments are not reliable, then we should not trust any judgments produced by those methods. So the skeptic would ask two challenge questions: how can one justify the particular method that an individual utilizes in generating basic beliefs about contingent state of affairs and how can one justify the reasoning methods that one uses to determine if it is deductive or inductive? These are the questions the skeptic would ask regarding the problem of criterion and the effects of the method used to test reliability of perception.
The third premise by Hummer examines the reliability of our sense organs in correlation to our perspective of the external world.