I are heavy’, where the concept ‘heavy’ is not

I will consider the
analytic-synthetic distinction outlined by Kant. He asserts that
judgments, or statements, are one of two types, analytic or synthetic.
an analytic statement is one on which the predicate concept s contained
in the subject concept, whereas in a synthetic statement, the predicate
concept is not contained in the subject concept. Kant’s example of an
analytic statement is ‘all bodies are extended’, in which the concept
extended is entailed by the concept ‘bodies’, since part of the
definition of ‘body’ is ‘extension’. An example of a synthetic statement
provided by Kant is ‘all bodies are heavy’, where the concept ‘heavy’
is not entailed by the subject ‘bodies’, as ‘heavy’ is not part of the
definition of body’. Analytic statements, according to Kant, are true
independent of experience; we have only to analyze the meaning of
concepts within such statements to know that they are true. My
main concern is that it is unclear how a statement can have truth-value
if it is not in need of empirical verification. To be sure, not all
sentences have truth-value. Questions and commands, for instance, are
neither true nor false. However, not all sentences which have the form
of statements are genuine statements. The statement (1) ‘my favorite
food is pizza’ can be true or false because the meaning of this
statement can be linked up with some fact about the world, namely,
whether or not my favorite food is pizza. On the other hand, the
statement (2) ‘the best food is pizza’ does not have truth-value, as it
is unclear what is meant by ‘best’, and whether there is, in fact, a
‘best’ food. Thus, to be a genuine statement, there must be a
correspondence between its meaning and some objective basis. The world
normally serves as the objective basis for truth-value, but when it is
removed from the equation, there must be something else which replaces
the world to determine the truth-value of analytic statements. I find it
difficult to see how meaning alone can serve as the standard by which
truth-value is measured, for meaning does not seem to have the same form
of mind-independence that the world does.